009-Association as Representation - as is ;
Let X and Y be any two objects.
Very clearly the awareness of both objects X,Y is not the same as 2.
And this is true because the awareness of X,Y is not the same as the awareness of 2.
AW:X,Y ≠ AW:2
hence X,Y ≠ 2
But X,Y do REPRESENT two objects.
That is X and Y are both OBJECTS. And together, they are TWO objects.
In ordinary language I am using "is" and "are" but if I am being very explicit, X and Y are not identical to the idea we call OBJECT. they are instances of the idea, OBJECT. And X and Y together are not identical to two objects, they are an instance of TWO OBJECTS.
Or X is X as OBJECT. And Y is Y as OBJECT instance. And both X,Y is X,Y as an instance of 2 object instances.
if X is a Giant-Purple-People-Eater, and Y are Donny Osmond's Socks, then we would also say X and Y are Purple... meaning explicitly that X is an instance of a PURPLE object, and Y is an instance of a PURPLE object.
We know, from our own experience that AW:OBJECT = OBJECT but AW:OBJECT ≠ AW:Giant-Purple-People-Eater A Giant-Purple-People-Eater and an object are not the same thing, but we can associate them together. How do we do that? How do we distinguish them and make them similar?
This is the primary problem faced in the construction of an artificial intelligence, how are things different and similar? In a comuter system there are no objects, there are variables and variable values. Which opens up the question, how does the concept of VARIABLE get associated to Giant-Purple-People-Eater? Or to "Donny Osmond's purple socks"? or to the number 2? How is a VARIABLE an OBJECT of experience?
Just to note that originally I said X is X as an OBJECT instance. But an instance of a thing, is the thing. That is what we mean by instance. This way of speaking is a reference to categories or sets of objects. Categories are problems of representation. How are things put into categories? What is the mechanism of category formation that takes place in awareness? Representations relate to each other, and these relations form complex webs.
The mathematical approach to sets and categories assumes sets and categories exist apart from their elements. But what we find is that elements are objects of awareness that are associated together. This association is used as the basis for a set or category. The association does not occur before the element, it occurs after the awareness of the element, or at least concurrently. There are times where we know what a category is, and then go looking for elements in that category, but again, we become aware of the element, and then check it's association to a category.
In mathematics sets are treated as first order, a priori objects. but this is not the case. elements are used to construct categories. you cannot get to any specific element from a category, and if you do (while think of a category) the selection process for the element is hidden behind layers of implicit association.
To understand membership in a set requires a computation, which in this context is an association, a representation of an element belonging to a set. Without that computational fact of mathematical sets, then how do we determine if elements belong to sets? Ordinarily we say because we calculate the value of some element, we test it against a category rule for instance. But how do we know what to test? Would we test cucumbers against the set of integers? How could we do that test?
Or we may ask, How do certain shapes make a face? How do we see faces in clouds, or on people? What is the process that produces associations to faces? And can this process be modeled?
In a typical computer system, it is programmers that are making these associations. Even when programmers develop a system such as neural nets, the programmers are the ones feeding the net data and determining which algorithms to use. How could a computer be aware and makes these associations for itself?
I propose that a computer based AI should, in theory, auto-generate it's own associations. And this process of making associations is not the same physical process that we perform when we make those associations with our brains. If awareness and association making are not solely a feature of nervous systems, then we should see awareness and association making arise in systems that are not nervous systems. That is, if awareness and representation making is restricted to nervous system then it could never arise in a computer system.
Unless there is some extra non-physical facts about nervous systems, that cannot be modeled by computer, we should at some point expect to see computers produce awareness and make representations (given we know how those work). And if representations and awareness can be made by computers, even through simulations of brains, then there is no explicit reason awareness and representation making could not be made using different models other than nervous systems. That is, computers could be aware and make representations without doing nervous system simulations. What is required is for us to adduce the process of awareness and the representation making out of the nervous system models.
Either awareness and representation making is non-reductive from our own biology or it can be understood as something separate from our biological experience and hence can be modeled in a computer, or by some other physical or virtual process.
We know awareness is a feature of the universe or of reality, and we observe that awareness manifests itself through our biology. But since it is a feature of the universe, it is not NECESSARILY manifested through biology. It may be the case that awareness is fundamentally tied to our biology or nervous system. but if that is the so, then even computer simulations of our biology or nervous system should not give rise to awareness. But if awareness and association making is solely a feature of our biology, then it makes an argument that awareness is a fact that cannot be modeled or virtualized in any computer system. If it's possible to dis-entangle awareness and representation from our biological make up, it makes a case that awareness is extra physical, or in ordinary language, supernatural. (it supervenes on physical nature.)
By dint of our own observation, awareness is a feature of the universe. That does not necessitate that awareness must be tied to specific objects of awareness like our biology or nervous system. If we could construct a computer system that is aware, then we should see that the function of awareness in the computer system is the same function in us, that awareness of an object is the same as the object itself to the computer system.
One way to tell if this is happening is when we see computers make mistakes or errors. As it stands, computers do not make errors. Only people do. And when we see an error in a computer system, it is not the computer who corrects the error, it is the programmer.
As people we do not "correct" errors either. We "make" errors and we "make" corrections. A computer system that is aware and makes representations should itself be able to make both errors of representations and correct representations.
For instance, a computer should be able to say a VARIABLE is a Giant-Purple-People-Eater and a Giant-Purple-People-Eater is real.
AW:VARIABLE associated to AW:Giant-Purple-People-Eater associated to REAL OBJECT. and then also make the correct association to real objects just as we do:
AW:VARIABLE associated to AW:Giant-Purple-People-Eater associated to REAL OBJECT as a FALSE STATEMENT
AW:VARIABLE associated to AW:Giant-Purple-People-Eater associated to FICTIONAL OBJECT as a TRUE STATEMENT.
Let's illustrate this problem by considering unicorns. We know that unicorns are not real, that is they are not real in the same way that horses are real. But unicorns are real in stories. And they could be real animals, if the world were different. A person may engage in a breeding program or a genetics experiment to produce a unicorn and thereby make unicorns real. So in a way, unicorns are real, just not yet. Just not real in the same way horses are real.
For a time, many people believe Santa Claus is real. And then they know he is not real, and then some people actually become Santa Claus. Perhaps this a function of belief. but even if it were a function of belief, how would a computer system begin to "believe"? Before it can believe, it must first be aware and have representations about itself and the world. How would a computer system believe in Santa Claus?
How are we able to have these representations? How do we represent unicorns or Santa Claus as real and not real AT THE SAME TIME? How do we create various contexts to handle the concept of real so that the above paragraph about unicorns makes any sense at all? We do not extract meaning from the paragraph based on it's syntax and use of words alone but also by our experiences. How does an ordinary person see how a unicorn can be both real and fictional and possibly real.
ordinarily we refer this kind of thinking to "common sense". but there is nothing common about unicorns. Common sense is the same as using the cloud symbol in a diagram and noting the "something magic happens here".
This magic thing we call awareness and representation. If we produce artificial minds, they should be able to experience unicorns. And so they must be aware of unicorns and how unicorns are real, are fictional, and may become physicallyl real.
AW:UNICORNS as real
AW:UNICORNS as fictional
AW:UNICORNS as maybe real
When we think about Santa Claus, or unicorns, or people's beliefs, such as God, or truth, or vanilla, or the kinds of experiences people have, such as with gravity, or ai,r or fictions, or itches, or each other, or the number 5, or water or any other of the seemingly endless ideas and experiences we have in the universe, we are confronted by a real problem: All of these things relate to each other. And they relate to each other in ways that appear similar and in ways that appear orthogonal, and sometimes they relate to each other in ways we do not even understand.
As is ;
The simplist way to create representational or associative statements is to use the word, "as".
for instance, if we think of the Roman Numeral symbols for numbers. we say "V" is 5. or "V" as the number 5.
I as 1
II as 2
III as 3
IV as 4
V as 5
VI as 6
VII as 7
VIII as 8
IX as 9
X as 10
XL as 40
L as 50
C as 100
CXX as 120
D as 500
M as 1000
MCMLXVII as 1967
in ordinary language MCMLXVII is 1967. But clearly "MCMLXVII" is not "1967" because the symbols are completely different. We mean that "MCMLXVII" refers to the same number that "1967" refers to. Or
"MCMLXVII" refers to SOME NUMBER. the same as SOME NUMBER represented by "1967"
we could replace "refers to" or "represented by" with "as" and "the same as" with "="
so: "MCMLXVII" as SOME NUMBER = SOME NUMBER as "1967"
but why not replace "as" with a symbol of it's own?
for that purpose I will use the semi-colon. ;
thus: "MCMLXVII" ; SOME NUMBER = SOME NUMBER ; "1967"
This is how we can model representation symbolically, with a semi-colon ;
unicorn as fiction --> unicorn;fiction
unicorn as real --> unicorn;real
unicorn as maybe real --> unicorn;[maybe real]
I ; 1
V ; 5
C ; 100
XCIX ; 99
MCMLXVII ; 1967
using the semi-colon symbol ";" we can show all kinds of representations even though we may express those representations with different words. We may use "as", or we may use "is", or "the same as", or we may use "refers to", or we may use "in the form of", or "is a type of" or we may use "represents".
We may say a "X" is a VARIABLE in the form of a Giant-Purple-People-Eater. The name "Giant-Purple-People-Eater" refers to a fictional creature or is a type of fictional creature.
Giant-Purple-People-Eater ; [fictional creature]
X,Y ; [2 OBJECTS] --> X,Y is the same as 2 OBJECTS
[2 OBJECTS] ; 2 --> 2 OBJECTS refers to 2
2 ; II --> 2 in the form of II
2 ; SOME NUMBER --> 2 represents some number
II ; SOME NUMBER --> II represents some number
By using a simple symbol to show representation making, we will see how different objects of experience are associated how they are representations.