029a-Distribution of representations

Different ideas exist with different relationships to other ideas.  This distribution of ideas give rise to valuations and meta idea structures.   

eg. physical experiences are in a different class from emotional ideas or logical valuations.  The connections these ideas have to each other are different.  

the physical experience is representational different than non-phsyical experiences. These different kinds of ideas have a kind of distribution.  Meaning that we associate different ideas to each other in different ways.  Purely in terms of representations, the distribution of experiences, of representations is not purely a matter of meta representations to structure or arrange ideas.  Rather, ideas have connections to each other according to rules of their own. 

Sounds are not sights (unless you are synesthetic.)  smells are not numbers.  but sometimes numbers can speak loudly.    This is not just about metaphors.  It is about experience.  We experience ideas.  But the connections and distributions and how ideas group together is not drive ENTIRELY by meta ideas of organization.   

Insight seems to come not from the accretion of information but the connecting of different ideas to each other.  The synthesis of ideas is not a straight forward experience.  the generation of new ideas does not proceed from the expansion of existing ideas.  the synthesis of new ideas occurs precisely when the expansion of different representations leads to contradictions.  

If we lived in a universe where ideas grew out of each other, then we should not expect to encounter conflicting ideas nor should we expect to encounter novel ideas or novel synthesis of ideas.  

As an observation of ideas in general, it should be clear that ideas, experiences, representations do not exist according to an purely representational structure, but exist, are experienced based on some substrate that is not managed by meta concepts.  that is not organized according to representational principles, but is organized according to other principles.   

If knowledge expanded regularly than we should see predictions about that expansion.  We can make some kinds of prediction this way, and we organize our representations and experiences in this regular way.  However, we also expand experiences and representations orthogonally.  And more than that, we often have insight driven by disparate experiences, disparate representations.  

The idea of metaphor itself is the problem.  How can we have metaphors if the representational universe is ordered, is structured. 

We think of mathematics as preceding from simpler concepts to more complex concepts.  We think of almost all knowledge and experience as following that kind of representational model.  But is that how experience, how representation and knowledge in fact develops?  No, all knowledge development comes in fits and starts.  sometimes as periods of regular accretion, and other times where there are long periods of no new knowledge development that can be quickly changed with the spontaneous recognition of new ideas.  

this is one of the lessons of improvisation.  We can improvise solutions to problems and situations in moments.  (see Impro).  the point of improvisation is to arbitrarily apply different, even outlandish actions to particular situations.  But how is this possible, if representations exist in a structured way?  Because the structure is itself a representation.  We believe our structures of experience and representations are not just ideas, but are organizing principles.  

synthesis, novelty, discovery, and improvisation all demonstrate whatever structure we may wish to impose on oure experience, our experience has a hidden level that makes representations that disregards whatever structures we believe organizes representations. 

this does not mean representations and experience do not form a kind of distribution.  It is obvious that experiences and representations do cluster together.   But the cluster is not organized by representational principles, but by the underlying structures which instantiate representations.  And those processes are explicitly not representational. 

We think of ideas as having some kind of organizing principles.  But in fact, we don't experience the universe of ideas in that way.  our experiences, the qualia of experience, the mood of the storm, the happy grumbling of hungry tummy.  The ravenous desire to run in the rain.  The melancholy emptiness of abstractions.  These are all qualia of experience that are incongruous connections between experiences, between representational and physical experiences.  

the organizing principle of representations, of experiences, and of ideas is not some extrinsic representational framework, but is some internal construction that seems to arise solely from experience.  

the final proof of this is the generation of new ideas.  How are new ideas generated?  They are not generated programmatically!  We may use methods and programs to experience ideas, and consider problems.  Certainly computation can lead us to new ideas.  But there is something else.  there is some extra process that appears hidden from computation, programmatic methods.  The generation of new ideas not driven by old ideas, it is driven by experience directly.  

generating new ideas points us in the direction of processes which are explicitly non-representational as the source by which new ideas come into existence. A non-representational process is what generates new ideas and new experiences.  A non-representational process is what happens as we learn to discern and discriminate between different ideas and experiences.  

If we were to believe that there is some extrinsic feature of ideas, of representations that comes into learning and discovery, then we would need some mechanism for that to occur.  And there simply is no mechanism we know of whereby the organization of idea or the arrangement of ideas or the progression of knowledge CAUSES the apprehension or experience of new ideas through learning and discovery.  

the process of learning and discovery is not a process that is initiated by ideas.  it is not a process that is FORCED by the nature or organization of ideas, or representation.  the distribution of learning and knowledge and experience and understanding between cultures would not exist if the universe of ideas impacted how ideas develop.  Not to say that for individuals ideas do not matter.  But that development or learning and discovery are not driven by ideas and representational structures and the "academic" modeling of knowledge.  

meta concepts, values, etc are ideas too that must be discovered.  This is the inverse of dualism.  Where is the origination of ideas in a dualistic universe?  Where does a homonculus get it's ideas to move around the man?   Ordinarily we worry about what controls the homunculus, and what controls that homunculus and so on.  But we must equally wonder where "control" itself comes from.  How does control itself occur?  We assume, in a dualist model, that the homunculus controls the man (the mind controls the man for instance)  but where does control itself come in?  

What is the origin of concepts?  What is the origin of control?  What is the origin of qualia?  What generates qualia, not just as experience, but as ideas?
previous next